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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of partisanship in the road to the Belgian mayoralty. It confirms the 
expectation that most mayors have quite extensive party records prior to coming to office. Although 
different degrees of partisanship are thus relative, they tend to sort both internal and external effects. 
Mayors with a highly partisan background give a more active interpretation of their initial 
recruitment and get a head start in their political career. They also more frequently come from 
families that are deeply engaged in politics. In addition, they combine their own partisan experience 
with additional recruitment apprenticeships. Having held a function in a party and having 
experienced extensive party support make mayoral orientations more partisan in terms of task 
importance and exchange of views with party leaders.  
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1. Parties in Transformation 
 
In many contemporary democracies, parties and politics have almost become synonyms because the 
former operate a range of crucial functions for the latter. In mediating between civil society and 
government, parties aggregate and articulate interests for collective goal formulation. While such 
functions are programmatic, others are more societal, providing the agency with political learning 
and participation and mobilisation devices. Parties also contribute to state governability by forming, 
sustaining and facilitating government (Sartori, 1976; Ware, 1996). Currently, however, parties are 
going through a well-documented era of functional transformation ranging from partisan 
dealignment over the convergence to catch-all or electoral-professional party machines to a gradual 
cartelization with the state (Katz and Mair, 1995; Luther and Müller-Rommel, 2005).  
 
This paper turns to one of these crucial but shifting party functions in studying elite recruitment for 
public office. To be more precise, the role of parties in recruitment is studied at a specific 
governmental level (local), and for a specific function (mayor) in a specific context (Belgium). By 
contextualising the role of the parties in Belgian local government, and by outlining the office of 
mayor, the importance of parties in political recruitment is subsequently scrutinized in the 
theoretical part of the paper. The empirical part combines insights from two datasets on Belgian 
mayors. First, we focus on the proliferation of party experience in mayoral recruitment. Second, 
party recruitment effects are sought both internally (career start and development, partisan 
centrality) and externally (aspects of local political leadership).  
 
2. Janus in the Belgian Hybrid Local Party System?   
 
Despite their increasing colonisation of governmental institutions at most levels, parties have been 
almost an extraneous body in many polities for a long time.  A non-political or at least  non-partisan 
conception of local government has always contributed to this feeling. In this conception, local self-
government was seen as dedicated to the politically neutral common good of the local community. It 
called for singular, rational, and technical solutions in public service in which partisanship could only 
distract from the core of the issues (Fallend et al., 2006). It was only from the 1970s onwards that 
local party politicisation increased as a response to sharpening the public debate stemming from 
deeper societal, economic, and ecological transformations (Copus, 2004). This partisan reappraisal 
has often been interpreted in terms of nationalisation with the parties active at the centre level also 
incrementally acclaiming its local counterpart. In many municipalities, the local branches of national 
parties have become the leading forces in a partisan government. Still, the implicit equation with 
4 
 
non-partisanship (at least in national terms) has not entirely left the local scene and the remaining 
importance of various local lists is illustrative in that sense. Moreover, students of local party politics 
have observed a shrinking relevance of party politics not in the least due to the growing dominance 
of governance-like decision-making over representative institutions populated by party politicians 
(Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998).  
 
The Belgian local party system needs to be based on this equilibrium as well. Although the research 
on the broader embedding of parties in the local political system has been rather scarce, their 
importance in the electoral process is well documented (Buelens, Rihoux and Deschouwer, 2008). 
Particularly after the municipal amalgamations in 1976, Belgian local elections could be characterised 
as highly party politicised even in national terms (Dewachter, 1994). Up to the 1970s, local lists were 
the dominant political force in many municipalities. On average, more than two thirds of all local 
elections have been predominantly or even exclusively nationalized since 1976. Today, local branches 
of national political parties gain approximately 80% of all votes, and they often exclusively make up 
the partnership in the case of coalition government (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006).  
 
Some important qualifications should be added to this rather rough shift (based on the nominal 
criterion of national labels). Genuine national control and homogeneity might vary there where local 
branches of national parties dominate (Deschouwer, 1996). Moreover, local lists still seem to give a 
distinct place-bound touch to the electoral process in many municipalities. Local lists have been 
present in elections in approximately 75% of all the municipalities since 1976. Yet, the local label flag 
seems to cover a highly varied loading. In addition to genuine local phenomena, it also covers 
pseudo-local initiatives (cartels of national parties with a local name, lists named after popular 
mayors who have clear national party affiliations). Nevertheless, these lists tend to proliferate in 
small-sized municipalities, and thereby going with a distinct profile in terms of organisation, political 
style, and policies, which suggests a partisanship light (Steyvers et. al, 2007). Thus, partisanship tends 
to be a structural and underlying force in local politics where the system is hybrid in terms of 
nationalisation.   
 
3. Doorkeepers of Public Office? Parties and Local Political Recruitment 
 
Literature suggests that the parties at the local level, apart from their double-faced appearance, 
resemble the Roman god Janus in yet another way of being the crucial doorkeepers in political 
recruitment, the ‘…process by which individuals are selected for inclusion among political elites’ 
(Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1999: 153) currently colluded with (candidacy for) elections. Parties 
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tend to play an important role both in the supply of eligible candidates and in the demand for 
eventual candidates (Norris, 1997). Regarding the latter, two central questions seem important: Who 
selects? What do these selectors look for? 
 
The complex interaction of several actors on the demand side and their reluctance to give an insight 
into this ‘secret garden of politics’ (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) make the answer to the first question 
less straightforward. Yet, research has traditionally identified parties to be among the core actors 
when it comes to certification (social screening and political channelling of aspirations) and eventual 
selection of candidates (Seligman, 1961; Brand, 1972). This is also reflected in the self-proclaimed 
recruitment history of many councillors (Prewitt, 1970; Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999).  
 
Yet parties are not monolithic actors where all members are equally and univocally involved in 
recruitment. Also, subgroups emerge at the local level (rivalling). They engage deeply in candidate 
selection. As Hunt and Pendley (1972) have shown in their seminal study, local recruiters belong to 
the ‘grey eminence’ of the partisan scene. These community gatekeepers tend to combine the 
narrower involvement in the political sphere with the broader civic engagement by using their status 
to exert an indirect influence. Local party leaders often take the central position in these groups. 
Although they might be predominant, these party subgroups have no monopoly on recruitment. 
Support groups often take up sponsorship to promote certain candidacies (Seligman, 1971). 
 
What are these selectors looking for? The research carried out by Brady and his colleagues (1999) 
suggests that they are looking for something familiar. Since politically relevant features are not 
always apparent to the naked eye of the recruiter, the latter uses informational shortcuts to identify 
(and mobilise) potential targets. This explains to the authors why recruiters so often fish in the pond 
of their own social and particularly partisan networks and (thus) reinforce a somewhat self-mimic 
type of candidate selection. When it comes to candidates, many see activities and networking in 
party organisations or the broader political sphere as crucial to the acceptance of their candidacy 
(Irwin, 1976). Other insights (Bochel and Denver, 1983) suggest that monitoring by recruiters is not 
strictly partisan though. Selectors logically value candidates that have electoral potential. To this end, 
subjective personal characteristics (e.g., communication skills) tend to serve more than strictly 
political ones (e.g., loyalty to party ideology). The extension of Hunt and Pendley’s research on actual 
recruitment criteria is in line with the latter.  
 
Parties also seem to play an important role on the supply-side of recruitment where future politicians 
acquire political capital and become motivated to strive for public office. Literature often places 
6 
 
them within the broader involvement in civil society of many later political recruits. Local 
associations, in particular those close to the political sphere, are considered as the highway to the 
community power structure. They socialise members by providing collective solidarity for a common 
goal, serve as apprenticeships for governing, allowing the development of valuable networks (Balme, 
1986). At the same time, they enhance the visibility of potential candidates for office for both 
selectors and the public (notoriety). Many future councillors identify involvement in civic 
organisations as an important gateway to their eventual recruitment (see Moss and Parker, 1967). 
Without any doubt, parties belong to the core of this organised community life, and many future 
politicians have held membership and/or active governing functions in their ranks.  
 
While such insights refer to recruitment in general, this paper focuses on leadership selection for the 
office of mayor in the Belgian local government context. Before coming to a more specific analysis of 
the latter subject, it is therefore necessary to outline the appointment and the position of the 
mayoralty in this local political system.  
 
4. From Central Agent to Local Principal. Mayors in Belgian Local Government 
 
While the Franco tradition in central-local relations has often been identified as one of the central 
historical features of Belgian local government (Steyvers, 2007)1, the office of mayor is usually in the 
collegiate tradition of an inter-governmental organisation in which layman primacy results in a 
monistic and collective conceptions of the executive formed by the college of mayor and aldermen 
(Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). While the latter are elected by the council, the former is appointed by 
the central government, though today in formal terms only. The mayoral function has undergone 
substantial evolutions.  
 
Shortly after Belgian independence, the electoral and functional conditions for the mayoralty had 
already become the focus of fierce political discussion because of the introduction of the first 
Municipal Act in 1836. The conservatives opted for the central appointment of the mayor, which 
aimed to place a tutorial agent in the heart of the municipalities of the time. The pressure from the 
Liberals led to a compromise: the King should appoint the mayor from among the elected members 
of the local council. At that time, however, mayors had little to no local competences and very few 
official tasks to fulfil (Ackaert, 2005). They acted primarily as agents of their central principals. The 
mayoral function has gradually become more localised.  
 
7 
 
Since the adoption of the New Municipal Act in 1989, the central appointment has only survived in a 
largely symbolic fashion. The local council still provides the gateway to the function because mayors 
are appointed from among its Belgian members for the six-year period of the concurrent legislature.  
Nonetheless, an important political criterion has now been added to these formal requirements. 
Only the council members can propose a candidate for mayor2. In practice, the assignment of the 
mayoral position is thus subject to the bargaining process that is associated with the formation of 
governmental majorities. The largest party often  gains the office, while the number of preferential 
votes collected by certain candidates plays a predominant role in assigning mayoralty to a specific 
individual (Steyvers, 2004). In nearly all cases, the central government appoints the candidate 
proposed by the council. This pseudo-appointment system has been fiercely debated regarding the 
possibility of a direct election of mayors (Steyvers et al., 2006).  
 
A similar tendency can also be observed with regard to the content of the mayoral function. 
Formally, the mayor has always had a dual mandate, which involves central and local competences. 
However, central competences have been reduced to the level of merely symbolic and highly 
fragmented tasks. Local competences have gained ground by placing the mayor in a pivotal 
governmental position, even far beyond formal regulations. In general, mayors are key figures in the 
political institutions of local government. They head the council, keep in touch with related 
governmental layers, and act as the formal political figurehead responsible for the local 
administration, particularly concerning local policing and security policy.  
 
The political significance of the mayoral functions goes far beyond the formal competencies that are 
now predominantly locally anchored, but still limited. It has undoubtedly become the single most 
important local political office (Ackaert, 2005). In terms of the role and task orientation, mayors 
identify themselves with municipal policy-making and government by developing a vision for their 
locality and by encouraging new projects for which they actively lobby. At the same time, mayors 
have become the trustees of their citizenry. Many mayors consider helping citizens with 
(governmental) problems to be an important part of their job. In addition, they take up ceremonial 
and representational tasks for the municipality. Finally, mayors also act as the political leaders of 
their majority and party (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2005). 
 
5. The Partisan Recruitment of Mayors in Belgium? Research Questions and Data 
 
The gradual (national) party-politicisation of Belgian local elections, the central role of partisan actors 
in recruitment, the predominant valuation of party criteria in candidate selection combined with the 
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incremental localisation, and party politicisation of the mayoral function contribute to the 
expectations that mayors follow a highly partisan and politically agglutinated pathway to power.     
The specific evidence that supports these assumptions is rather indirect or relatively old. It shows 
that parties play first violin in composing local electoral lists. The leading party actors engage in the 
candidate screening process that is often under the influence of interest groups and approved by the 
broader realm of party activists (Buelens, 1996). Regarding the specific pathway to executive 
functions in this context, parties again show up when the distribution of these mandates comes to 
the fore as part of majority formation. Party branches are consulted in a large majority of cases. The 
latter tend to value the number of preferential votes, and the governmental ability and experience 
are perceived as the most important criteria in (party) political life (Ackaert, 1996). Previous research 
on councillors (Devos et al., 1997) showed that almost two out of every three councillors was a 
member of a political party before attaining their office for the first time. Half of them displayed 
some activity in the party, while one third also exercised a function in the governing bodies of the 
(local) party.  
 
While such insights hint at a partisan road to the mayoralty, this paper aims to present more direct, 
encompassing and up-to-date evidence of the importance of the national political party involvement 
in achieving mayoral office. Our analysis serves both descriptive and explanatory ends. Firstly, it 
assesses more generally the political capital mayors might have collected in parties during their 
recruitment process. To what extent are mayors elected from the lists of candidates with ties to 
national politics? Does their history of political activism before becoming a mayor reflect 
involvement in political parties and to what extent? What factors might give grounds for variation in 
this pattern? 
 
Secondly, the paper pays attention to the potential effects of such a partisan path in recruitment. 
Internally, it focuses on the career start and development towards the mayoralty. Externally, it 
studies the effects of partisan recruitment on aspects of mayoral leadership. Does a partisan 
recruitment influence the priorities, time distribution or conceptions of democracy, and local 
governance once in office?   
 
This paper draws on two quantitative datasets. The first one results from a postal survey conducted 
in 2002. It focused on the recruitment process of Belgian mayors (N = 379). Here, the response was 
high (64.3%). Data were representative of region, number of inhabitants, and partisan background 
(Steyvers, 2004). The second one stems from the international research project ‘Political Leaders in 
European Cities’, a comparative assessment of mayoral leadership in 16 European countries. It  deals  
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with the municipalities of over 10 000 inhabitants (Bäck, Heinelt and Magnier, 2006). For Belgium, 
the authors conducted research in 2003. They also included the mayors of small municipalities         
(N = 242). Here, the response was a bit lower (41.1%), but still representative of the variables 
mentioned. Both datasets refer to the mayoral legislature 2000-2006. For most questions, the focus 
of the study was the first mandate as mayor. There were two standardised questionnaires. For the 
most part, they used closed questions. 
 
This approach needs two important interpretative qualifications. First, it studies a process by its 
outcomes because our respondents have effectively achieved their mayoralty. Moreover, studying 
variation in this group may overemphasise heterogeneity in a group that actually shares many 
characteristics. Second, since the mayors themselves replied to the questionnaires, we should speak 
of a subjective reconstruction of recruitment experiences rather than of an objective account of 
party importance in candidate selection. However, the factual nature of a number of elements under 
study provides a counterweight to an all-too subjective and hence inconclusive account of this 
process.  
 
6. Proliferation of Partisanship in the Recruitment History of Belgian Mayors 
 
To what extent does partisanship colour the recruitment history of Belgian mayors? We can start to 
answer this question by using our 2002 dataset and focusing on both attitudinal and behavioural 
descriptive components of partisanship. Table 1 presents some indicators, reflecting the preference 
for a national political party, and the activity within the ranks of (youth branches of) political parties. 
Incumbents were asked to reflect on the period prior to their first mandate as mayor.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
As the table shows, the large majority of Belgian mayors (almost 90%) have a clear preference for a 
national political party in the period prior to their first mayoralty. Christian democrats are most 
popular, while liberals and socialists (each of them) represent one quarter of mayoral preferences. As 
the Christian democrats are considered to be the most centrist among the traditional parties, it 
should not surprise us that when mayors were asked to place themselves on the left-right scale, the 
average value was 5.0 (s = 1.7). This observation holds even if approximately 30% of all the mayors 
indicate that they were elected on a local list (i.e., not bearing any national name or number) in the 
election leading them to their first mandate as mayor. These partisan orientations tend to be 
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translated into subsequent behaviour, although less from the early life phases of the future mayor 
(youth branches of political parties), but outspokenly in the further development of his career.  
 
Mere membership is similar to the proliferation and distribution of party preferences. At least the 
more passive apprenticeship in the ranks of a party tends to be an unavoidable asset for mayoral 
recruitment. The latter goes well beyond the symbolic token of a party membership card. On 
average, this group of respondents held party membership for 18.5 years (s = 9.3) prior to their first 
mandate as mayor. Yet partisan involvement went further than an enduring membership. More than 
80% of all mayors were also active in their party by offering assistance in electoral campaigns, and by 
attending party meetings on a regular basis. A large majority of mayors (almost two-thirds) also 
exercised a party function in the period before their first mandate. Beyond the proverbial coffee-
making, the largest group of respondents who were party officials functioned as a president3. If the 
three most important party functions are considered (president, vice-president, and secretary), 70% 
of this group is covered. On average, this function was exercised for 8.4 years (s = 6.4) before 
becoming mayor. In almost three-quarters of all cases, the party function was exercised at the local 
level. This suggests that future mayors have extensive roots in the local party organisation they have 
often governed.   
 
Youth branches of political parties can be a fruitful environment for the breeding of political talent 
and partisan socialisation. As our data show, they seem to be a less unavoidable road to be taken 
when it comes to mayoral recruitment. Still, a large number of our respondents were members of 
these youth branches, and more than a quarter of them even exercised a function in it. Again, the 
position of President was most popular among these office holders. In the majority of cases, the 
function was exercised at the local level. 
 
What happens if we consider these partisanship indicators together? Is partisanship cumulative? 
Could we hence index it with varying degrees of importance as a recruitment factor? Considering the 
dummied presence of a political preference, membership, (activism) and exercising a function in a 
(youth branch of a) political party do not allow genuine scaling based on factor analysis4. Yet there 
are good theoretical reasons to assume that the somewhat reverse cumulative nature of partisanship 
with those active in the more intense dimensions are likely to have less demanding indicators of 
involvement in their party track record. The correlation matrix of the variables under study5 supports 
this assumption. Therefore, we created a count variable from the affirmative answers to the 
dummies mentioned. The histogram displayed in graph 1 illustrates this partisanship index. The index 
scores vary between 0 and 6, given the indicators under study6.  
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[Graph 1 about here] 
 
Generally speaking, the graph confirms that most respondents have quite extensive party records 
before attaining the mayoralty. Hence, only 6% of all the mayors could be termed as entirely non-
partisan, and 65% of them are to be above the scale mid-point. Further analysis shows that it is 
especially the indenture at a relatively young age in the ranks of the party youth branch that sets 
apart the most partisan recruitment path from the lesser one. So, when considering party 
recruitment as a continuum, it should be kept in mind that it is relative, i.e., the bulk of all mayors do 
have some (and many quite a few) partisan marks on their pathway to office.  
 
If such variation exists, what factors might account for it? Given the non-normal distribution of our 
index7, logistic regression might help us out. As a dependent variable, the index of partisanship was 
transformed into a dummy with a value of 1 referring to high scores (i.e. 5 or more)8. A number of 
factors were considered as independent variables that were assumed to have an impact on 
partisanship. Some factors refer to the broad municipal environment of mayoral recruitment. We 
know from previous research (Steyvers et al., 2007) that the nationalisation of the party system 
tends to be most outspoken in the Flemish region of Belgium. We can expect that this would lead to 
more partisan recruitment reflected in extensive records of accomplishment in political parties. The 
same holds true for urbanisation. In high-density environments, electoral competition is more 
outspoken and often translated into national terms (Dewachter, 1994)9.  
 
Other factors are more closely linked to the mayoral recruitment itself. In addition to the factor 
indicating that the mayor was elected on a national list, Garraud’s (1989) assumptions of the         
left-wing tradition and the time-bound increase in partisan recruitment were analysed. As Garraud 
expected the latter to become the standardised core routes into office after the 1990s, the 
respondents who took up mayoral office for the first time following the elections of 1994 or later 
were set apart from their counterparts who had taken office earlier. Multicollinearity did not reach 
any critical values. Table 2 represents the results of this logistic regression analysis. Data refer to 
odds ratios and significance10. Nagelkerke R² reflects the overall explanatory power of the model. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The overall model is highly significant, but moderately strong at predicting whether mayors belong to 
the highest category of party recruitment. Not all factors are significant or equally important though. 
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An environmental factor and an electoral one can account for variation. A mayor from the northern 
region of Flanders has significantly more chances to have the most extensive record of party 
accomplishments (mean index score = 4.3 against 3.4). The same holds true for the respondents who 
were elected on a list with clear national references, though the effect of this variable was much 
larger than that of the region (mean index score = 4.7 against 2.9). Contrary to our expectations, 
urbanisation and age of entry had no significant predictive power of partisanship when considered 
together with the other variables mentioned.  
 
7. Parcel of Political Cocooning? The Internal Effect of Partisan Recruitment 
 
The recruitment history of our mayors thus tends to be highly partisan in several respects. While 
such a picture stands out for the Belgian mayor in general, we have found some variation in 
partisanship among them. Here we want to take the analysis one step further by scrutinizing the 
potential effect of differences in partisan recruitment. In this section, we study its internal effects on 
other dimensions and aspects of recruitment. Firstly, we focus on the effect of variation in 
partisanship on the career start and development of our respondents. Secondly, we take into 
consideration some alternative routes to the mayoralty, and we study the extent to which they serve 
as functional equivalents or as additions to partisan recruitment. Since our dataset is richest in 
partisan experiences in the mayor’s background, the analysis of internal effect will focus on this 
dimension.  
 
7.1. Career Start and Development 
 
Does variation in partisan recruitment change the modes through which future mayors enter politics, 
the motives they attribute to their first candidacy, and the moments important to career 
development? Table 3 gives some answers to these questions. As an indicator of partisanship, the 
previously developed index is dichotomised into higher and lower strata11. Data refer either to the 
percentage of mayors observed in each category or to the mean value of the characteristic under 
study.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Mayors were asked to reflect on the way in which they initially were exposed to local politics. A 
recoding of the initial alternatives, among which mayors had to select the one that was deemed most 
important, showed significant differences according to partisanship12. The respondents with the 
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highest level of partisanship more frequently referred to their own initiative, interest or conviction, 
and to mediation by specific persons (family, friends, and acquaintances) or associations to the 
detriment of being asked (the drafted) as their initial mode of political recruitment. Of course, these 
alternatives are not mutually exclusive in terms of substance. Yet in our opinion, they refer to 
different logic of interpretation of the early stages of recruitment. Especially the drafted tend to a 
more passive model of inclusion among the political elites that need an external push of an explicit 
demand to overcome the last threshold of effective recruitment. Highly partisan mayors tend to give 
a more active interpretation of initial recruitment.  
 
If modes are different, then are motives too? The answers to an open-ended question about the 
most important motive for the future mayor to be a candidate on the electoral list for the first time 
are recoded in the categories displayed in the table. However, they reveal no significant differences 
in cross-tabulations according to partisanship13. Yet some tendencies appear. While there is some 
kind of civic duty that is most frequently mentioned as the most important motive for candidacy 
among all mayors, it is less outspoken so for the respondents with the highest levels of partisanship. 
The latter more often refer to a party duty or to the idea that their candidacy could bring about 
change, renewal or rejuvenation of local politics. There are some hints of notable recruitment and 
taking a distance from politics among those with lower levels of partisanship.  Giving in to an explicit 
recruitment request is seen as a duty for the local citizenry rather than a deliberate effort to engage 
in local party politics.  
 
At a significantly later age, such an engagement tends to occur among the future mayors from the 
lower partisan strata. This holds true for the age at which our respondents became members of a 
political party, stood (successfully) for election for the first time, and eventually became mayor14. 
There is a notable and constant difference of approximately six years between both groups of 
mayors in each of these momentums. While highly partisan mayors thus engage at a significantly 
younger age, this confirms insights from previous research on the non-contractibility of political 
careers (Schlesinger, 1966; Hain, 1974). These data probably also reflect deep involvement in youth 
branches of political parties in the higher partisan strata.  
 
7.2. Alternative or Additional Apprenticeships? 
 
Political capital and motivation for recruitment may well be collected through other means than on a  
strictly partisan basis. Other factors might overwrite, compensate or add up to party experiences on 
the pathway to mayoralty. Do mayors acquire their political skills elsewhere?  To what extent do 
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these experiences operate as a functional equivalent to partisanship? Should they be considered as 
additions to the party recruitment model? Table 4 represents a number of such alternative 
apprenticeships. Data are cross-tabulated according to the partisanship index. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Coming from a privileged social background is often considered as an important base for political 
recruitment (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006). The future mandate holders come from the higher social 
strata with substantial links to politics. Garraud (1989) has suggested that while social characteristics 
might be of importance for the recruitment of all mayors, partisanship could function as an 
alternative asset for individuals with a less favourable background. The indicators that are displayed 
in the table do not confirm such a distinction. Rather, a favourable social background tends to belong 
to the assets of every future mayor.  
 
There are no significant differences between the higher and lower partisan strata when it comes to 
gender, local roots (being born in the municipality) or coming from a brokerage profession. The latter 
refers to high status jobs that are complementary with politics because they often allow flexible time 
arrangements, professional independence, the development of politically useful networks, and that 
enhance coming into contact with the political sphere (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). In our analysis, 
we categorised teachers, managers from private firms, higher civil servants, and people from the 
liberal professions (e.g., lawyer, doctor) under this heading15. This is the only favourable background 
characteristic more often found among the mayors from the lower partisan group though. The 
mayors from the higher partisan strata significantly more frequently have a university education16.  
 
Coming from a political family could be a powerful asset to mayoral recruitment. Many future office 
holders tend to contract the political microbe at home quite literally becoming familiar with public 
issues and the customs of the political process (Lecomte, 1989). Sometimes, such an overexposure to 
political stimuli occurs along politically agglutinated lines with future recruits growing up with the 
example of a close relative that is a partisan militant or even an office holder. Especially in the latter 
cases, familial political notoriety might be an important advantage to the ambitious office prospect 
(Garraud, 1992). A substantial part of our questionnaire focused on the influence of familial actors on 
mayoral recruitment. Especially the parents of our respondents were studied.   
 
The family politicisation index could be constructed from this analysis (Van Liefferinge and Steyvers, 
2009). This PFI stems from two count variables. The first one refers to the extent to which 
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respondents have a father who had an interest in politics, a clear political preference, was a member 
of an ideological association, a member of a political party, or he exercised a political mandate 
himself. This counting was replicated for the mother. Despite the fact that father politicisation data 
are predictably more outspoken than mother politicisation data, the scores on both count variables 
tend to covariate in a political family dimension producing a reliable 0-10 scale17. The mean score on 
the latter is displayed in the table. Mayors from the higher partisan strata score significantly higher 
on this index than their counterparts18. Since its indicators tend to be cumulative, the deeply rooted 
partisan record of the future mayor seems to be mirrored by a similar party encapsulation of his 
close family with almost dynastic fringes.   
 
It is often assumed that experience in other political mandate is the best proxy of eligibility and 
electoral success for any given mandate (Kjaer, 2006). As our description of the function has made 
clear, the mayoralty is among the most important mandates at the local level in Belgium. More 
experienced politicians can attain the mayoralty more easily than mere neophytes can. Our data 
confirm this. A large majority of mayors have had other elective mandate before becoming mayor for 
the first time. Yet, the differences between the lower and higher partisan strata are significant when 
it comes to the necessity for the previous career as a mayoral recruitment token19. The mayors with 
the highest partisan background tend to follow the core route into office, combining extensive party 
experience with a successful apprenticeship in the very heart of the political realm. Such a path 
suggests political cocooning of the future mayors who are gradually becoming encapsulated into 
institutionalized politics. While approximately 57% of all mayors combine both experiences, this 
figure rises to more than 85% when the highest partisan strata are considered.  
 
Political careers tend to be locally anchored and gradually built up. The respondents were asked to 
indicate the mandate they had held and deemed most important prior to the first mayoralty. A large 
number of mayors referred to the mandate of councillor (20%) and to the mandate of alderman 
(57%) as most important before attaining their office. Successful experience in an executive mandate 
covers a number of policy domains and functions as a manifest office (Schlesinger, 1966) to the 
mayoralty. That the number of mayors from the higher partisan group referring to local offices is 
lower than among the lower partisan group is the result of more frequent parliamentary experience 
among the former.  
 
Finally, the table displays a number of other associations that could function as equivalents to parties 
such as unions, other ideological associations or their non-ideological counterparts (e.g., sports, 
culture or music). It represents means of the index scores for count variables covering membership, 
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activism, and holding office in these associations. Regarding unions and non-ideological associations, 
the differences between the higher and lower partisan groups were not significant. This picture is 
different for ideological associations. Here mayors from the higher partisan strata show significantly 
more involvement20. Such associations can often be found in the periphery of party organisations. 
This has once again confirmed the general conclusion from the table that alternate recruitment 
assets should be considered as an addition rather than as a genuine alternative to a partisan pathway 
to office. 
 
8. Does Party Matter? The External Effect of Partisan Recruitment 
 
Partisanship tends to have an internal effect on recruitment. Could we extend this effect also to an 
external dimension? Does coming from a highly partisan background influence the way mayors  
actually understand and fulfil their mandate? While most of the literature has focussed on the effect 
of social background characteristics as recruitment features to explain role conceptions and 
behaviour in public (e.g., Edinger and Searing, 1967; Offerdal, 2003), others have included partisan 
experiences to explain variation in the functioning of the locally elected bodies such as the council. 
While Thurber (1976) and Fielin (1967) are more indirect in their seminal studies (by showing that 
the general party domination in a given constituency, and specific recruitment control tend to 
produce office holders that are highly partisan in their outlook and actions), Bäck has shown in a 
recent comparative analysis (2006) that party matters when considering the latter within a broader 
framework of mayoral loyalties. Not too surprisingly, party membership and perceived support from 
partisan actors especially matter for the mayoral tasks that are directly associated with parties. 
 
The use of the extended Belgian data from the comparative set on which Bäck has drawn his 
conclusion allows us to broaden partisan orientation beyond task conceptions in a country-specific 
context21. The questionnaire enables us to study the effect of different (partisan recruitment) 
variables on a number of role dimensions that can be linked to the partisan orientation of mayors. 
For tasks, the importance attached to the party programme implementation is studied. Time refers 
to the proportion dedicated (on average) to political party meetings every week. The frequency of 
communication with the leaders of their own parties can tell us something about the contact 
patterns of mayors. Lastly, we scrutinized the agreement mayors expressed on the statement that 
political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation. Since none of the dependent 
variables were normally distributed, a logistic regression analysis was conducted on dummies of the 
originals with code 1 referring to the respondents scoring highest in terms of the initial values22.  
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As independent variables, various factors referring to dimensions of partisan recruitment were 
included to indicate the number of years respondents were party members, the extent to which they  
held party offices before becoming mayor, and the support they perceived from partisan actors 
during elections. These categories of variables thus link to both demand and supply factors of 
partisan recruitment. Two contextual counterparts were added to the direct partisan variables for 
which the analysis shows in table 2 that they have an impact on the partisanship level in mayoral 
recruitment, i.e., election on a list that is a local branch of a national party and attaining the 
mayoralty in a Flemish municipality23. Multicollinearity has not reached any critical values. Table 5 
presents the analysis results. The data in the table refer to odds ratios and significance of any given 
relationship. Nagelkerke R² summarizes the overall explanatory power of the model.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The model shows mixed results when it comes to explaining variation in different dimensions of 
mayoral partisan orientations. It cannot significantly predict the odds for mayors to be placed in  
higher categories of importance and proportions regarding the party programme  implementation or 
the time spent in party meetings. The overall agreement on considering the party programme  
implementation as one of the mayor’s most important tasks might help to understand why variation 
cannot be linked to partisan recruitment. Only partisan support produces a significant effect: the 
more a mayor perceived such support, the more importance he tends to attribute to implementing 
the party programme. For mayor’s time management, a general reluctance to spend considerable 
amounts of time for party activities comes forward. This probably refers to a restrictive 
interpretation of such activities because contact with councillors or co-members of the College of 
Mayor and Aldermen can have a strong partisan dimension. Such activities might also lead to the 
limited importance of the party outside public office.  
 
The model gains in explanatory power for communication and participation. Mayors with experience 
as party officials, and those who perceived much support from partisan actors have significantly 
higher chances of communicating with their own party leaders on a weekly basis or more frequently. 
There tends to be a profound and frequent exchange of views between the mayors whose 
recruitment is rooted in a partisan environment and the party leaders, which suggests extensive 
interdependence between them. Unexpectedly, the odds of the mayors elected on national lists (i.e. 
local branches of national parties) are lower when it comes to the frequency of contact with partisan 
leaders. While the overall model significantly explains variation in the extent to which mayors agree 
that parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation, none of the single independent 
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variables refers to odds that are significant. Having held a function in a political party before 
becoming mayor comes closest to a significant effect.    
 
9. Conclusion. Mayoral Recruitment between Partisan Standards and Cumulative Options 
 
This paper seems to confirm most assumptions about strong partisan mayoral recruitment that 
places Belgium in the higher strata of the partisan dimension Bäck (2006: 149) has identified as an 
important (but often neglected) factor in the comparative analysis of local leadership. With the local 
party politicisation of the office, mayoral recruitment came to the core of party functioning at the 
municipal level. As a result, most mayors have quite extensive party records before attaining the 
mayoralty. Therefore, variation in partisan recruitment is relative. Nearly all mayors seem to meet 
the lower partisan standards that tend to be unavoidable to attain the mayoralty (such as 
membership and activity in or support from party organisations and/or actors). For many, such 
standard equipment (or survival kit) is supplemented by more intense party involvement, frequently 
in the early stages of political life. 
 
Stronger partisan involvement tends to produce both internal and external effects on mayoral 
recruitment. The respondents with a highly partisan background give a more active interpretation of 
their initial recruitment that begins at an earlier age, a head start carried along for the rest of the 
(pre)mayoral career. In addition, they frequently come from the families that are deeply engaged in 
politics, and they combine their own partisan experiences with additional recruitment assets such as 
other elective mandates and involvement in ideological associations. Rather than referring to 
alternate pathways to office, such a pattern points to a recruitment that is either taking place in a 
narrower and separate political sphere or not.  
 
Party recruitment also seems to matter externally, but not in all aspects, always and/or to an even 
extent. Having held a function in a party, and, more frequently, having experienced extensive party 
support make mayoral orientation more partisan in terms of task importance and exchanging views 
with party leaders. This suggests that parties tend to be a kind of an internal perceptual screen 
operating in the back of our respondents’ mind, especially with partisan support, regularly tuning 
mayoral waves of thinking and acting to a partisan frequency. Its amplitude is partially dependent on 
the extent to which partisan experiences colour the pathway to office.  
 
With partisanship as a general characteristic of mayors, its extensive forms seem to produce recruits 
that are engaged in the narrower and institutionalized political sphere of society at an earlier stage in 
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life, and tend to accumulate (valued) additional political capital within it. This political agglutination 
also turns loyalties to parties more strongly. The dramatic evocation of ‘parties without partisans’ 
should be modified for at least Belgian mayors (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). Parties keep a firm 
grip on the recruitment for one of the most important elected functions at the local level in Belgium. 
Such encapsulation might provoke tensions with general dealignment of parties that become  
isolated in public office with mayors coming to office and acting in it with a strong partisan frame of 
reference, and thus very different from the general citizenry. If such a division of political labour 
might come without clear mediation in an era where representation gives way to responsiveness 
(Rao, 2000), it could lead to a self-referential and auto-reproductive recruitment that could stimulate 
a problematic gap between citizens and politicians. However, future research has to deal with this 
potential challenge to representative democracy.  
 
20 
 
References 
Ackaert, J. (1996) ‘De kiezers delen de kaarten uit, de partijen spelen ermee’, In J. Buelens and K. Deschouwer 
(eds) De dorpsstraat is de wetstraat niet, pp. 50-74. Brussel: VUBPRESS. 
Ackaert, J. (2005) ‘The Transformation of the Political Executive in Belgian Local Government, In R. Berg and N. 
Rao (eds) Transforming Political Leadership in Local Government, pp. 168-79. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Bäck, H. (2006) ‘Does Recruitment Matter? Selecting Path and Role Definition’, In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. 
Magnier (eds) The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, pp. 123-
50. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.  
Bäck, H., H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) (2006) The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context 
of Local Democracy. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Balme, R. (1986) ‘Councillors, Issue Agendas and Political Action in Two French Towns’, In A. Mabileau, G. 
Moyser, G. Parry and P. Quantin (eds) Local Politics and Participation in Britain and France, pp. 135-156. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Brady, H., K. Schlozman and S. Verba (1999) ‘Prospecting for Participants. Rational Expectations and the 
Recruitment of Political Activists’, American Political Science Review 93(1): 153-68. 
Brand, J. (1972) ‘Party Organization and the Recruitment of Councillors’, British Journal of Political Science 2(4): 
472-86. 
Buelens, J. (1996) ‘Over lijsten, namen en macht verwerven’, In J. Buelens and K. Deschouwer, K. (eds) De 
dorpsstraat is de wetstraat niet, pp. 39-49. Brussel: VUBPRESS. 
Buelens, J., B. Rihoux and K. Deschouwer (eds) (2008) Tussen kiezer en hoofdkwartier. De lokale 
partijafdelingen en de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2006. Brussel: VUBPRESS. 
Copus, C. (2004) Party Politics and Local Government. Manchester: MUP. 
Dalton, R. and M. Wattenberg (eds) (2002) Parties Without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Deschouwer, K. (1996) ‘Nationale partijen en gemeenteraadsverkiezingen’, In J. Buelens and K. Deschouwer 
(eds) De dorpsstraat is de Wetstraat niet, pp. 13-26. Brussel: VUBPRESS. 
Devos, C., E. Matthyssen, H. Reynaert and J. Van Hoe (1997) ‘Hoe komen toekomstige mandatarissen in contact 
met de lokale politiek?’, Res Publica 39(1): 63-88. 
Dewachter, W. (1994) ‘Gestalten van gemeenteraadsverkiezingen en de samenvoeging der gemeenten’. In 
Gemeentekrediet (eds) De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen en hun impact op de Belgische politiek (1890-1970), 
pp. 465-490. Brussel: Gemeentekrediet. 
Edinger, L. and D. Searing (1967) ‘Social Background in Elite Analysis: a Methodological Inquiry’, American 
Political Science Review 61(2): 428-45.  
Fallend, F., G. Ignits and P. Swianiewiczs (2006) ‘Divided Loyalties. Mayors between Party Representation and 
Local Community Interests’, In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor. Political 
Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, pp. 245-70. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.  
Fiellin, A. (1969) ‘Recruitment and Legislative Role Perceptions: A Conceptual Scheme and a Case Study’, 
Western Political Quarterly 20(2): 271-87. 
Gallagher, M. and M. Marsh (eds) (1988) The Secret Garden of Politics. Candidate Selection in Comparative 
Perspective. London: Sage Publications.  
Garraud, P. (1992) ‘La ville en héritage. Hérédité familiale et héritage politique chez les maires urbains’, In C. 
Patriat and J. Parodi (eds) L’Hérédité politique, pp. 219-34 Paris: Economica. 
Garraud, P. (1989) Profession: homme politique. La carrière politique des maires urbains. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Hain, P. (1974) ‘Age, Ambition and Political Careers’, Western Political Quarterly 27(2): 265-75. 
Hoffmann-Martinot, V. (1998) ‘Urban Political Parties. The Role and Transformation’, In T. Clarck and V. 
Hoffmann-Martinot (eds) The New Political Culture, pp. 123-45. Boulder: Westview Press.  
Hunt, L. and R. Pendley (1972) ‘Community Gatekeepers: an Examination of Political Recruiters’, Midwest 
Journal of Political Science 16(3): 411-38.  
Irwin, G. (1976) ‘Party, Accountability and the Recruitment of Municipal Councilmen in the Netherlands’, In H. 
Eulau and M. Czudnowski (eds) Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities, pp. 163-204. New York: Sage. 
Katz, R. and P. Mair (1995) ‘Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy’, Party Politics 1(1): 5-
28. 
Kjaer, U. (2006) ‘The Mayor’s Political Career’, In H. Bäck, H., Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor. 
Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, pp. 75-98. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.  
Lecomte, P. (1989) ‘Comment viennent-ils à la politique? L’engagement des nouvelles recrues du RPR’, Revue 
Française de Science Politique 39(2): 683-97. 
21 
 
Luther, K.-R. and F. Müller-Rommel (eds) (2005) Political Parties in the New Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Moss, L. and S. Parker (1967) Management of Local Government. Volume 2. The Local Government Councillor. 
London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. 
Mouritzen, P. and J. Svara (2002) Leadership at the Apex. Politicians and Administrators in Western Local 
Governments. Pitssburg: Pitssburg University Press. 
Norris, P. (1997) ‘Theories of Recruitment’, In P. Norris (ed) Passages to Power. Legislative Recruitment in 
Advanced Democracies, pp. 1-14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Offerdal, A. (2003) ‘Whose Mayor? Representational Roles in Local Politics’, In H. Baldersheim M. Illner and H. 
Wollmann (eds) Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, pp. 273-88. Leske + Budrich: Opladen. 
Prewitt, K. (1970) The Recruitment of Political Leaders. A Study of Citizen-Politicians. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill 
Company Inc. 
Rao, N. (ed) (2000) Representation and Community in Western Democracies. Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schlesinger, J. (1966) Ambition and Politics. Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Seligman, L. (1961) ‘Party Structure and Political Recruitment’, American Political Science Review 55: 77-86. 
Seligman, L. (1971) Recruiting Political Elites. Glencoe: General Learning Press.  
Steyvers, K. (2004) Van burger tot burgervader. Het politieke rekruteringsproces van de Belgische 
burgemeester. Brugge: Vanden Broele. 
Steyvers, K. (2007) ‘Wat is lokale politiek?’, In H. Reynaert (ed) De Kerktorenpolitiek voorbij? Lokale politiek in 
Vlaanderen, pp. 17-40. Brugge: Vanden Broele. 
Steyvers, K. and H. Reynaert (2005) ‘Een noord-zuid kloof in de lokale politiek? Een vergelijking tussen de 
Vlaamse en de Waalse burgemeester’, Burger, Bestuur & Beleid 1(3): 223-41. 
Steyvers, K. and H. Reynaert (2006) ‘”From the Few are Chosen the Few”. On the Social Background of the 
European Mayor’, In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the 
Changing Context of Local Democracy, pp. 43-74. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Steyvers, K. and H. Reynaert (2006) ‘Van kartel tot cordon: de inzet van de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen 2006’, 
In H. Reynaert (ed) Naar een versterkte lokale en provinciale democratie, pp. 1-37. Brugge: Vanden Broele. 
Steyvers, K., H. Reynaert, K. De Ceuninck and T. Valcke (2006) ‘Mayors in Governance: Heading for Efficiency 
and Democracy. The Belgian Case’, Local Government Studies 32(4): 1-18. 
Steyvers, K., H. Reynaert, K. De Ceuninck and T. Valcke (2008) ‘All Politics is Local, Partisan or National? Local 
Lists in Belgium’, In E. Holtman and M. Reiser (eds) Farewell to the Party Model? Independent Local Lists in 
East and West European Countries, pp. 169-94. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.  
Thurber, J. (1976) ‘The Impact of Party Recruitment Activity upon Legislative Role Orientations: A Path 
Analysis’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 1(4): 533-50. 
Van Liefferinge, H. and K. Steyvers (2009) ‘Family Matters? Degrees of Family Politicization in Political 
Recruitment and Career Start of Mayors in Belgium’, Acta Politica 44(2): 125-149. 
Ware, A. (1996) Political  parties and party systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
22 
 
Tables & graphs 
Table 1. Partisanship indicators among Belgian mayors  
Partisanship  % N 
Political preference 
  Present 
  Nature 
   Christian democrat 
   Liberal 
   Socialist 
   Other 
 
89.4 
 
43.6 
26.0 
25.0 
5.4 
 
334 
 
146 
87 
84 
18 
Party youth branch  
  Member 
  Function 
   President 
   Other 
 
41.4 
27.0 
57.6 
42.4 
 
156 
102 
57 
42 
Party 
Member 
Active 
Function 
 President 
 Vice-president 
 Secretary 
 Other 
 
90.5 
81.5 
62.3 
41.7 
11.7 
16.6 
30.0 
 
343 
309 
235 
93 
26 
37 
67 
 
Graph 1. Partisanship index among Belgian mayors 
 
0 2 4 6 
Score 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
Frequency 
Mean = 3.9 
Std. Dev. = 1.7 
N = 374 
Partisanship index 
23 
 
Table 2. Partisanship index among Belgian mayors. A logistic regression analysis 
 Partisanship Index (high) 
Factor Exp(B) Sign 
Region 
    Flanders 
 
2.47 
 
.002 
Urbanisation 
    High-density population 
 
1.12 
 
.677 
List 
    National 
    Socialist 
 
3.61 
1.08 
 
.000 
.816 
Era of entry 
    First mayoralty [>1994] 
 
1.28 
 
.355 
Nagelkerke R² .18 .000 
N = 346 
 
Table 3. Modes, motives and moments of recruitment according to partisanship 
  Partisanship Index 
Career Low High General 
 %/mean N %/mean N %/mean N 
  Modes 
      Self-starter 
      Drafted 
      Mediated 
      Other  
 
27.9 
51.9 
17.3 
2.9 
 
58 
108 
36 
6 
 
36.3 
29.2 
33.6 
0.9 
 
41 
33 
38 
1 
 
30.8 
43.9 
23.1 
2.2 
 
99 
141 
74 
7 
  Motives 
      Civic duty 
      Party duty 
      Policy plans 
      Job/career opportunity 
      Change/renewal 
      Other 
 
37.9 
10.0 
10.9 
12.2 
12.2 
14.8 
 
91 
23 
25 
28 
28 
34 
 
29.5 
16.7 
11.4 
11.4 
16.7 
14.4 
 
39 
22 
15 
15 
22 
19 
 
36.0 
12.5 
11.1 
11.9 
13.8 
14.7 
 
130 
45 
40 
43 
50 
53 
  Moments 
      Party member 
      Candidate 
      Elected 
      Mayor 
 
28.5 
35.0 
35.6 
46.3 
 
191 
230 
230 
229 
 
22.4 
29.7 
30.6 
40.9 
 
125 
130 
130 
128 
 
26.1 
33.1 
33.8 
44.4 
 
316 
360 
360 
357 
 
Table 4. Alternate apprenticeships in recruitment according to partisanship 
 Index of partisanship 
 Low High General 
Apprenticeship %/mean N %/mean N %/mean N 
Social background 
   Male 
   University education  
   Brokerage profession 
   Local roots 
 
95.0 
40.9 
59.1 
62.2 
 
226 
97 
140 
148 
 
95.6 
53.0 
55.2 
66.7 
 
129 
71 
74 
90 
 
95.2 
45.3 
57.7 
63.8 
 
355 
168 
214 
239 
Political family 
   Political family index 
 
3.1 
 
239 
 
4.8 
 
135 
 
3.7 
 
374 
Political mandate 
   Experience 
   Local 
 
79.5 
83.3 
 
190 
155 
 
88.9 
76.1 
 
120 
90 
 
82.9 
80.6 
 
310 
245 
Associational life 
   Unions 
   Ideological associations 
   Non-ideological associations 
 
0.8 
0.4 
1.0 
 
239 
239 
239 
 
1.0 
0.8 
1.2 
 
135 
135 
135 
 
0.9 
0.6 
1.1 
 
374 
374 
374 
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Table 5. Dimensions of partisan orientation among Belgian mayors. A logistic regression analysis 
 
N = 194, 197, 201, 199 
 Partisan orientation 
 Task 
[programme 
implementation] 
Time 
[party meetings] 
Communication 
[party leaders] 
Participation 
[best mechanism] 
 Exp(B) Sign. Exp(B) Sign. Exp(B) Sign. Exp(B) Sign. 
Partisan recruitment 
  Member [experienced] 
  Function  
  Support [high] 
 
0.74 
0.78 
2.16 
 
.342 
.409 
.014 
 
0.65 
1.50 
1.55 
 
.183 
.192 
.160 
 
0.71 
2.48 
2.26 
 
.270 
.003 
.010 
 
0.96 
1.70 
1.65 
 
.879 
.080 
.105 
List 
   National 
 
1.12 
 
.765 
 
1.17 
 
.705 
 
0.43 
 
.048 
 
1.54 
 
.274 
Region 
   Flanders 
 
1.22 
 
.503 
 
1.30 
  
.388 
 
1.06 
 
.850 
 
1.62 
 
.106 
Nagelkerke R² .05 .177 .04 .301 .14 .001 .08 .049 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Characterized by rather low functional proliferation and discretion, communalism dominates over service 
delivery counterweighted by frequent and personalized access (through accumulation of political mandates) to 
the centre. 
2
 To do so, a decree, which has been signed by the majority of all councillors (and those on the electoral list of 
the mayor), is necessary. 
3
 The mayors who indicated to have been party officials were asked to select the function they exercised and  
considered as most import 
4
 Given such dummies would be pseudo-rational only.  
5
 Correlation coefficients varied between .16 and .73 with all significant at the .002 level at least. 
6
 A score of 6 means that the mayor had a clear preference for a political party, was a member, and had a 
function in the youth branch of his party, and was a member, activist, and office holder in his party.  
7
 Kolgomorov-Smirnov = .17 with p = .000.  
8
 Frequencies for three equal groups showed the index scores of 5 and 6 to be high. They refer to 36.1% of all 
the valid cases. Purely theoretical, this dichotomy is probably not the best thinkable. The non-high group 
gathers mayors with no to little party experience of those who score up to 4. However, given the distribution of 
partisanship, it is the only valid empirical solution. 
9
 Population density was chosen over mere numerosity. In 1976, amalgamations made it possible that a 
number of rural and sprawling municipalities could form a new administrative structure so that high population 
numbers could still refer to largely rural areas. A continuous variable of population density was divided into 
three equal groups with high = 403 inhabitants/square kilometre or more, and 33.3% of all the cases. 
10
 Since all independents are dummies, their effect on the dependent could be compared to one another. Enter 
procedure was used. 
11
 High refers to values 5 and 6 in the index. Given the relatively limited total number of cases, a threefold 
categorisation showed to be less reliable empirically.  
12
 Cramér’s V = .25 and p =.000.  
13
 Cramér’s V = .14 and p =.249. 
14
 For party membership, only effective members were taken into analysis. All means differed significantly at 
the p =.000 level with Eta squares respectively = .16 (age party membership), .12 (age first candidacy at 
election), .10 (age first election) and .08 (age first mayoralty).  
15
 Original question: ‘what was your occupation before your first mandate as mayor’. The categorisation is 
slightly incomprehensive in the answers to the option ‘other, please specify’ a number of mayors stated to be 
professional politicians, a category well falling under ‘talking and brokerage professions’.  
16
 Cramér’s V =.12 and p =.025. 
17
 Principal component analysis for Father Politicisation Index (0-5; with x = 2,3 and s = 1,5) and Mother 
Politicisation Index (0-5; with x = 1,4 and s = 1,3) revealed an underlying component explaining 75,6% of 
variance. Reliability analysis produced a Cronbach’s alfa of .70.  
18
 Eta squared = .11 and p =.000. 
19
 Cramér’s V =.12 and p=.021. 
20
 Eta squared =.03 with p=.001. 
21
 In addition to (partisan) loyalties, Bäck also studied the effect of group belonging and socialization, and 
learning. The analysis showed that party loyalties were explanatory more often than group belonging and 
socialization variables, but also support from local community actors mattered for mayoral task conceptions. 
Bäck used data for 17 countries with the 10 000 inhabitant threshold. Here we will focus on Belgium only, but 
we will also include the mayors from the municipalities under 10 000 inhabitants. See section 5 for more 
methodological background. 
22
 For ‘tasks’, the original question was: ‘many different tasks are associated with the mayor’s position. How 
important do you think the following tasks are?’. Mayors could answer on a scale from 0 (not a task of the 
mayor) to 4 (of utmost importance). For the item ‘to implement the programme of my political 
party/movement’ x = 2.5 and s = 0.9 with ‘high’ (value 3 or >; thus of great importance or more) = 50.2%. For 
‘time’, the original question was: ‘how many hours each week do you, on average, spend doing the following 
activities ’? It was deemed necessary to record this time distribution in terms of proportion of the total time 
spent as a mayor rather than to focus on absolute numbers. For the item ‘political party meetings’, x = 5.4 and 
s = 4.6 with ‘high’ (value 5.9 or >) = 42.7%. For ‘communication’, the original question was ‘how often do you 
normally communicate (orally) with the following persons/groups of persons’. Mayors could express the 
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frequency of contact from 0 (seldom to never) to 4 (daily). For the item ‘leaders of my own party’ x = 1.8 and s 
= 1.0 with ‘high’ (value 2 or >; thus at least weekly) = 55.9%. For ‘participation’, the original question was ‘how 
much do you agree or disagree with the following statements’. Mayors could express agreement from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For the item ‘political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen 
participation’, x = 3.3 and s = 1.0 with ‘high’ (value 4 or >; thus at least agree) = 52.5%.  
23
 The partisan recruitment variables refer to the following. Member (experienced) is based on the total 
number of years experienced as a party member at the election of 2000. This variable (x = 25.2 and s = 10.6) 
was dichotomized in terms of experience based on mayors that had 30 years of party experience or more 
(42.9%). Party function refers to having held a party function before becoming mayor, which was the case for 
51.6% of all respondents. Partisan support refers to a scale score ranging from 0 to 20 with x = 8.3 and s = 4.3. 
This scale was based on correlating items on the original question ‘to what extent did you have the support of 
the following persons/groups of people in the last local election’. Mayors could answer from 0 (not at all) to 5 
(to a very great extent). Factor analysis showed a partisan dimension (51.3% of the variance explained) from 
the items ‘the national organs of your party’, ‘your party wing/faction’, ‘your party at the local level’, ‘national 
politicians’ and ‘unions’ that produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alfa = .75). The scale was dichotomized for 
mayors having extensive (score 10 or >; or 37.9% of all respondents) party support or not. For context 
variables, 80.3% of mayors were elected on a national list and 55.9% in Flanders. 
 
